Mar 2009 Opinions from the Texas Supreme Court

March 27, 2009 Tex. Opinions

Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C.,
No. 05-0729 (Tex. Mar. 27, 2009) (Opinion by Dale Wainright) (oil and gas law, statutory construction, cause of action for improperly plugging oil well, no standing of subsequent lessee)
EXXON CORPORATION AND EXXON TEXAS, INC. v. EMERALD OIL & GAS COMPANY, L.C.; fromRefugio County; 13th district (13-99-00757-CV, 228 SW3d 166, 01-27-05) The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.Justice Wainwright delivered the opinion of the Court. (Justice O'Neill not sitting)

Exxon Corp. v. Miesch,
No. 05-1076 (Tex. Mar. 27, 2009)(Wainwright)(plugging of oil well to prejudice future production subsequent to dispute over royalties, false statement to Railroad Commission, fraud, statute of limitations, oil and gas law,)
EXXON CORPORATION AND EXXON TEXAS, INC. v. EMERALD OIL & GAS COMPANY, L.C. ANDLAURIE T. MIESCH, ET AL.; from Refugio County; 13th district (13-00-00104-CV, 180 SW3d 299,11-29-05) The Court reverses and renders judgment, in part, and affirms, in part, the court of appeals' judgment,and remands the case to the trial court.Justice Wainwright delivered the opinion of the Court.(Justice O'Neill not sitting)

Prodigy Communications Corp. v. Agricultural Excess & Surplus Insurance,
No. 06-0598 (Tex. Mar. 27, 2009)(Jefferson) (insurance law, effect of noncompliance with prompt notice requirement as condition precedent for coverage of claim, prejudice factor)
PRODIGY COMMUNICATIONS CORP. v. AGRICULTURAL EXCESS & SURPLUS INSURANCECOMPANY, N/K/A GREAT AMERICAN E & S INSURANCE COMPANY AND GREAT AMERICANINSURANCE COMPANY; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-05-00442-CV, 195 SW3d 764, 05-30-06) The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment, renders judgment in part, and remands the case tothe trial court. Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice O'Neill, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice Medina, and Justice Green joined.
Justice Wainwright delivered a concurring opinion.
Justice Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Hecht and Justice Willett joined.

Financial Industries Corp. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co.,
No. 07-1059 (Tex. Mar. 27, 2009)(Jefferson)(cert. question from the 5th Circuit) (effect of insured's failure to give insurer prompt notice of claim, prejudice criterion, insurance policy construction)
FINANCIAL INDUSTRIES CORPORATION v. XL SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANYThe Court answers the question certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court.

Progressive County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Kelley,
No. 08-0073 (Tex. Mar. 27, 2009)(per curiam) (insurance policy documents were ambiguous, thus raising issues of fact precluding summary judgment) (contract construction, insurance coverage dispute, contract consisting of multiple documents, definiteness, ambiguity)
PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. REGAN KELLEY; from BrazosCounty; 10th district (10-06-00263-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 12-12-07) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and withouthearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to thetrial court. Per Curiam Opinion

Ginn v. Forrester,
No. 08-0163 (Tex. Mar. 27, 2009)(per curiam) (absence of evidence of notice insufficient to satisfy requirement of error on face of the record for purpose of restricted appeal)
EMMANUEL GINN, A&R TRANSPORT, INC., KEITH JACKSON, STEVE BRANTLEY v. JEFFFORRESTER AND KIM FORRESTER; from Harris County; 14th district (14-06-00549-CV, ___ SW3d ___,01-10-08) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and withouthearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals’ judgment and renders judgment. Per Curiam Opinion

March 6, 2009

Phillips MD v. Bramlett,
No. 07-0522 (Tex. Mar. 6, 2009) (Majority opinion by Justice David Medina) (insurance law, Stowers doctrine, liability cap)
BENNY P. PHILLIPS, M.D. v. DALE BRAMLETT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRAPTOR OF THE ESTATE OF VICKI BRAMLETT, DECEASED, SHANE FULLER AND MICHAEL FULLER; from Lubbock County; 7th district (07-05-00456-CV, 258 SW3d 158, 03-19-07) The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.Justice Medina delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice Johnson, and Justice Willett joined.

FROM THE MAJORITY OPINION:

We granted the petition for review in this case to consider the relationship between two provisions of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of 1977, now repealed. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4590i.[1] The first provision caps the liability of physicians (and other health care providers) above a fixed amount, adjusted for inflation, while the second creates an exception to this cap when the physician’s insurer has negligently failed to settle within the meaning of the Stowers Doctrine, that is, has negligently failed to settle a claim within the limits of the physician’s liability policy. The trial court here applied the Stowers exception to permit the rendition of a judgment against the physician in excess of the statutory cap. The court of appeals, in a divided decision, affirmed, concluding that the excess judgment was permissible because there was evidence that the insurer negligently failed to settle the claim against its insured, the physician. 258 S.W.3d 158. In other words, the court concluded that the statutory Stowers exception waived the liability cap for both the insurer and the insured physician. We disagree that this exception applies to the physician and accordingly reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the trial court.* * *In summary, we conclude that the Stowers exception of article 4590i, section 11.02(c), expressly applies to insurers only and does not waive the liability cap of section 11.02(a) generally. We further conclude that any probable harm caused by the asserted improper remarks in this case could have been cured by an instruction or retraction. No ruling, however, was requested or obtained, and the party’s objection was not alone sufficient to preserve the alleged error.

The court of appeals’ judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for it to apply the cap and render judgment consistent with our opinion.

Justice O'Neill delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, and Justice Green joined.