Citing Justice Scalia, Willett says Court should not delve into legislative history in statutory construction appeals when the text of the law as enacted by the Legislature is clear.
Justice Willett, concurring in the judgment [in AIC Management v. Crews, No. 05-0270 (Tex. Jan 25, 2008)(Opinion by Harriet O’Neill)] :
My only quibble with the Court's decision is that it peeks unnecessarily into the legislative history surrounding the 1985 enactment and 1989 amendment of section 25.1032. I agree with the Court that section 25.1032 constitutes "the Legislature's specific jurisdictional grant to county civil courts at law in Harris County over eminent-domain and title issues."[1]
But our analysis on jurisdiction should end with that declarative sentence. The statutory text is unequivocal, which makes it dispositive, which makes the tag-along paragraph examining the legislative history unnecessary.
True, in today's case, the cited history happens to be consonant with section 25.1032's unambiguous text, but it is not difficult to imagine cases where a shrewd snippet from a committee hearing or floor debate could contradict a result that the face of the statute plainly requires. Citing such background materials even to confirm the clear meaning of dispositive text suggests that the text alone is in fact not dispositive, but rather vulnerable to challenge by a stray floor-debate comment from an individual legislator or a witness testifying at a post-midnight committee hearing or a bill analysis drafted by a legislative staffer (or, just as likely, ghost-drafted by a lobbyist). The statute itself is what constitutes the law; it alone represents the Legislature's singular will, and it is perilous to equate an isolated remark or opinion with an authoritative, watertight index of the collective wishes of 181 individual legislators, who may have 181 different motives and reasons for voting the way they do.[2]
This Court recognizes that legislative intent is best embodied in legislative language. We recently cautioned that "over-reliance on secondary materials should be avoided, particularly where a statute's language is clear. If the text is unambiguous, we must take the Legislature at its word and not rummage around in legislative minutiae."[3] Faced with clear statutory language, "the judge's inquiry is at an end."[4] It may be a widespread practice to mine the minutiae of legislative records to discern what lawmakers had in mind, but as we have held, relying on these materials is verboten where the statutory text is, as here, absolutely clear.[5]
Accordingly, because the jurisdictional question can be decided without recourse to legislative history, we should decide the jurisdictional question without recourse to legislative history.
____________________________________
Don R. Willett
Justice
Opinion delivered: January 25, 2008
[1] __ S.W.3d __.
[2] Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a collective body.”).
[3] Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 652 n.4 (Tex. 2006).
[4] Id. at 652.
[5] Id. at 651–52. Justice Scalia, the foremost critic of supplementing clear statutory text with legislative history, has stated his position plainly:
As today's opinion shows, the Court's disposition is required by the text of the statute. . . . That being so, it is not only (as I think) improper but also quite unnecessary to seek repeated support in the words of a Senate Committee Report—which, as far as we know, not even the full committee, much less the full Senate, much much less the House, and much much much less the President who signed the bill, agreed with. Since, moreover, I have not read the entire so-called legislative history, and have no need or desire to do so, so far as I know the statements of the Senate Report may be contradicted elsewhere.
Accordingly, because the statute—the only sure expression of the will of Congress—says what the Court says it says, I join in the judgment.
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 267 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
CASE INFO:
AIC Management v. Crews, No. 05-0270 (Tex. Jan 25, 2008)(O’Neill) (condemnation, sufficiency of legal description, UDJA, jurisdiction of Harris County Civil Courts at Law)
AIC MANAGEMENT v. RHONDA S. CREWS, CURTIS CALDWELL CREWS, ANNETTE CREWS, DENISE CLAUDEN CREWS, AND CLAUDE CREWS, JR., THE HEIRS OF EMMA CREWS, VALDA CREWS, AND EVA FAY GROSS, AND ALDINE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; from Harris County; 1st district(01-03 01178-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 02-03-2005) (Opinion of the First Court of Appeals - by Higley)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Justice O'Neill delivered the opinion of the Court.
Justice Willett filed a concurring opinion.
Showing posts with label Opinions by Willett. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Opinions by Willett. Show all posts
Sunday, January 27, 2008
Sunday, January 13, 2008
Willett, lone dissenter, extolls virtues of uniformity and urges colleagues to join national "mainstream" in construing aviation insurance policy
On motion for rehearing, Justice Don Willett argues that the Court should not apply one enforcement rule to aviation contracts and a different enforcement rule to all other contracts. Interestingly, in the context of government contracts, the Court does not enforce contracts at all, but instead requires trial courts to shut the courthouse door in the name of sovereign immunity unless forced by the Legislature to keep it open under certain circumstances or for certain categories of defendants.
AIG Aviation v. Holt Helicopters, Inc. No. 06-0484 (Tex. Jan. 11, 2008)(Dissenting opinion on reh'g by Justice Willett)
AIG AVIATION (TEXAS), INC. AND NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA v. HOLT HELICOPTERS, INC.; from Uvalde County; 4th district (04-05-00291-CV, 198 S.W.3d 276, 04/26/06)
Dissenting opinion by Justice Willett on Motion for Rehearing of Petition
Justice Willett, dissenting from the denial of the motion for rehearing of the petition.
This Court has held—recently and repeatedly—that insurance contracts should be enforced according to their express terms:
$ Healthcare insurance contracts—we enforce them as written.[1]
$ Homeowners insurance contracts—we enforce them as written.[2]
$ Commercial general liability insurance contracts—we enforce them as written.[3]
Not so with aviation insurance contracts. In Puckett v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co., we engrafted a causal-connection requirement into the policy, requiring the insurer to show that the insured’s breach actually caused the damage or accident.[4] The Court held that while the policy unequivocally suspended coverage if there was no valid airworthiness certificate, public policy nonetheless trumped the contract’s express terms and barred the insurer from denying coverage if the insured’s violation of the aircraft-inspection requirement did not contribute to the crash.[5] In short, Puckett granted an unbargained-for expansion of coverage in the face of a bargained-for exclusion from coverage.
Puckett’s judicial rewriting of the parties’ contract clashes head-on with our “modest, text-based approach” to interpreting contract language.[6] As we have stressed, Texas courts must stick to what policies say, not what we wish they said.[7] I agree with Chief Justice Pope’s spirited dissent in Puckett: “Courts are not in the business of writing insurance contracts. Our duty is to apply unambiguous contracts as they are written.”[8] We should either (1) overrule Puckett, (2) distinguish it,[9] or (3) explain forthrightly why we insist on applying a hazy, public policy-based interpretive standard to aviation insurance contracts (an area where public safety concerns should urge hard-and-fast enforcement of safety-related provisions).[10]
Puckett’s nontextual approach is starkly at odds with our insurance decisions generally, and with most American jurisdictions’ aviation-insurance decisions specifically.[11] The Court should join the mainstream, not grant aviation contracts their own interpretive jet stream. Because “we should strive for uniformity” in giving effect to unequivocal contract terms,[12] we should not apply one enforcement rule to aviation contracts and a different enforcement rule to all other contracts.
I would decide the case, and because the Court declines to do so, I respectfully dissent.
___________________________________
Don R. Willett
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: January 11, 2008
[1] Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 649 (Tex. 2007).
[2] Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 746 (Tex. 2006).
[3] Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tex. 2007).
[4] 678 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. 1984).
[5] Id.
[6] Fortis Benefits, 234 S.W.3d at 649.
[7] Fiess, 202 S.W.3d at 753 ("[I]n construing insurance policies where the language is plain and unambiguous, courts must enforce the contract as made by the parties, and cannot make a new contract for them, nor change that which they have made under the guise of construction." (internal quotations omitted) (quoting E. Tex. Fire Ins. Co. v. Kempner, 27 S.W. 122, 122 (Tex. 1894))); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995) ("The primary concern of a court in construing a written contract is to ascertain the true intent of the parties as expressed in the instrument."); R & P Enters. v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex. 1980).
[8] 678 S.W. 2d at 940 (Pope, C.J., dissenting).
[9] Justice Duncan’s dissent in the court of appeals distinguished Puckett persuasively, pointing out how the policy exclusion in the instant case (requiring a minimum level of pilot experience) represented the “basis of the bargain,” while the missing airworthiness certificate in Puckett was deemed (inaccurately, in my view) a mere “technicality.” 198 S.W.3d 276, 288 (Duncan, J., dissenting).
[10] The anti-technicality statute—which forgives an insured’s breach or violation of the insurance policy unless it “contributed to cause the destruction of the property”—is facially inapplicable because it applies only to fire and personal property insurance, not to aviation insurance. Tex. Ins. Code § 862.054.
[11] See generally Noralyn O. Harlow, Annotation, Aviation Insurance: Causal Link Between Breach of Policy Provisions and Accident as Requisite to Avoid Insurer’s Liability, 48 A.L.R. 4th 778, 783 (1986) (“Most courts have agreed with the general rule that a causal link between the breach and the accident need not be proved where policy requirements relating to pilots are violated.”).
[12] Fiess, 202 S.W.3d at 752.
AIG Aviation v. Holt Helicopters, Inc. No. 06-0484 (Tex. Jan. 11, 2008)(Dissenting opinion on reh'g by Justice Willett)
AIG AVIATION (TEXAS), INC. AND NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA v. HOLT HELICOPTERS, INC.; from Uvalde County; 4th district (04-05-00291-CV, 198 S.W.3d 276, 04/26/06)
Dissenting opinion by Justice Willett on Motion for Rehearing of Petition
Justice Willett, dissenting from the denial of the motion for rehearing of the petition.
This Court has held—recently and repeatedly—that insurance contracts should be enforced according to their express terms:
$ Healthcare insurance contracts—we enforce them as written.[1]
$ Homeowners insurance contracts—we enforce them as written.[2]
$ Commercial general liability insurance contracts—we enforce them as written.[3]
Not so with aviation insurance contracts. In Puckett v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co., we engrafted a causal-connection requirement into the policy, requiring the insurer to show that the insured’s breach actually caused the damage or accident.[4] The Court held that while the policy unequivocally suspended coverage if there was no valid airworthiness certificate, public policy nonetheless trumped the contract’s express terms and barred the insurer from denying coverage if the insured’s violation of the aircraft-inspection requirement did not contribute to the crash.[5] In short, Puckett granted an unbargained-for expansion of coverage in the face of a bargained-for exclusion from coverage.
Puckett’s judicial rewriting of the parties’ contract clashes head-on with our “modest, text-based approach” to interpreting contract language.[6] As we have stressed, Texas courts must stick to what policies say, not what we wish they said.[7] I agree with Chief Justice Pope’s spirited dissent in Puckett: “Courts are not in the business of writing insurance contracts. Our duty is to apply unambiguous contracts as they are written.”[8] We should either (1) overrule Puckett, (2) distinguish it,[9] or (3) explain forthrightly why we insist on applying a hazy, public policy-based interpretive standard to aviation insurance contracts (an area where public safety concerns should urge hard-and-fast enforcement of safety-related provisions).[10]
Puckett’s nontextual approach is starkly at odds with our insurance decisions generally, and with most American jurisdictions’ aviation-insurance decisions specifically.[11] The Court should join the mainstream, not grant aviation contracts their own interpretive jet stream. Because “we should strive for uniformity” in giving effect to unequivocal contract terms,[12] we should not apply one enforcement rule to aviation contracts and a different enforcement rule to all other contracts.
I would decide the case, and because the Court declines to do so, I respectfully dissent.
___________________________________
Don R. Willett
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: January 11, 2008
[1] Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 649 (Tex. 2007).
[2] Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 746 (Tex. 2006).
[3] Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tex. 2007).
[4] 678 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. 1984).
[5] Id.
[6] Fortis Benefits, 234 S.W.3d at 649.
[7] Fiess, 202 S.W.3d at 753 ("[I]n construing insurance policies where the language is plain and unambiguous, courts must enforce the contract as made by the parties, and cannot make a new contract for them, nor change that which they have made under the guise of construction." (internal quotations omitted) (quoting E. Tex. Fire Ins. Co. v. Kempner, 27 S.W. 122, 122 (Tex. 1894))); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995) ("The primary concern of a court in construing a written contract is to ascertain the true intent of the parties as expressed in the instrument."); R & P Enters. v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex. 1980).
[8] 678 S.W. 2d at 940 (Pope, C.J., dissenting).
[9] Justice Duncan’s dissent in the court of appeals distinguished Puckett persuasively, pointing out how the policy exclusion in the instant case (requiring a minimum level of pilot experience) represented the “basis of the bargain,” while the missing airworthiness certificate in Puckett was deemed (inaccurately, in my view) a mere “technicality.” 198 S.W.3d 276, 288 (Duncan, J., dissenting).
[10] The anti-technicality statute—which forgives an insured’s breach or violation of the insurance policy unless it “contributed to cause the destruction of the property”—is facially inapplicable because it applies only to fire and personal property insurance, not to aviation insurance. Tex. Ins. Code § 862.054.
[11] See generally Noralyn O. Harlow, Annotation, Aviation Insurance: Causal Link Between Breach of Policy Provisions and Accident as Requisite to Avoid Insurer’s Liability, 48 A.L.R. 4th 778, 783 (1986) (“Most courts have agreed with the general rule that a causal link between the breach and the accident need not be proved where policy requirements relating to pilots are violated.”).
[12] Fiess, 202 S.W.3d at 752.
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