SUPREME CHARITY
Garrett vs. Borden (Tex. 2009) (per curiam)
Who said only big business, insurance companies, and government defendants win in the Texas Supreme Court? - Supremos issue another procedural mercy ruling in a prisoner's pro se IFP suit, okaying handwritten verbatim copy of inmate grievance decision in lieu of photocopy to satisfy requirement for judicial review (exhaustion of administrative remedies). Justice Brister did not even write a dissent.
In a previous case, the Supremos agreed to apply the mailbox rule to prisoner's filing although prisoner did not have access to a receptacle for outgoing mail maintained and operated by the U.S. Postal Service.
It will not make much of a difference since prisoners routinely lose their suits anyway, but a ruling in favor of an inmate litigant can help boost Court's legitimacy by creating the appearance that those at the bottom rungs of society have a fair shot at justice too, while not giving anything away substantively.
But that's not the only bonus that comes along with jurisprudential charity on access-to-justice issues. The latest opinion will also provide occasion for the Chief to tout the success of the new Pro Bono Referral Program, which not only curbs pro se pleading excessess - not to mention hand-written "briefs" - but also affords volunteer lawyers opportunities to gain or enhance supreme appellate experience.
Charity not only for writ writer riff-raff.
Charity with a purpose!
Showing posts with label prisoner suits. Show all posts
Showing posts with label prisoner suits. Show all posts
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Sunday, January 13, 2008
Reeling from Bias Allegations, Texas Supreme Court cuts underdogs some slack; Says incarcerated plaintiff should not be penalized
It is by no means true that the Texas Supreme Court picks cases only for the purpose of undoing consumer class actions, reversing large jury awards in personal injury cases, and changing controlling precedent to vindicate the financial interests of corporate defendents and insurance companies, and to relieve governmental entities and their wayward agents of responsibility by cloaking them with the mantle of sovereign immunity. Time and again, the Court also issues procedural mercy rulings, such as extending the benefits of the mailbox rule to an inmate with limited opportunity to get anywhere near a U.S. mailbox.
To the unabated joy of pro se, IFP, and otherwise underprivileged customers of the state's courts, here is the first such plaintiff-friendly mercy ruling for the new year:
Houser v. McElveen, No. 06-0504 (Tex. Jan. 11, 2008)(per curiam)
BRUCE WAYNE HOUSER v. KENNETH W. MCELVEEN, ET AL.; from Jackson County; 13th district (13-05-00426-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 02/09/06)
Petitioner Bruce Wayne Houser, a pro se inmate, sued for mandamus compelling respondent Kenneth McElveen, the county clerk of Jackson County, to probate Houser’s father’s will. The trial court dismissed the petition, and Houser asserts, without challenge, that he deposited his notice of appeal in the prison mail 35 days later. The court of appeals received it on the 46th day after the judgment was signed and dismissed the appeal as not having been timely perfected. ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2006) (per curiam).
The notice of appeal was required to be filed within 30 days of the judgment, Tex. R. App. P. 26.1, but the court of appeals should have extended that time if, within the next 15 days, Houser filed his notice of appeal and a motion for extension with a reasonable explanation, Tex. R. App. P. 10.5(b), 25.1(a), 26.3. The notice of appeal was deemed filed on the day he mailed it, since it was received one day after the 15-day deadline, Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(b), Ramos v. Richardson, 228 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam), and a motion for extension was thereby implied, Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). The question, then, is whether there is “any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to file within the [specified] period was not deliberate or intentional, but was the result of inadvertence, mistake, or mischance.” Meshwert v. Meshwert, 549 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. 1977).
In his notice of appeal, and in his petition here without challenge, Houser states that he mailed a motion for new trial nine days after the judgment, and a copy of a transmittal letter bearing that date is attached. There is no motion for new trial in the trial court’s record, but Houser could reasonably have believed that the clerk would receive it within three weeks of when he says he mailed it.
An inmate who does everything in his power to satisfy timeliness requirements may not be penalized for the error or tardiness of prison officials. See Williams v. T.D.C.J.-I.D., 142 S.W.3d 308, 309-310 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam). If a motion for new trial had been received within 30 days of the judgment, Houser’s notice of appeal would have been timely filed. Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a)(1). This plausible statement of circumstances indicates that Houser’s failure to timely file his notice of appeal was not intentional but inadvertent. See Hone v. Hanafin, 104 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam).
Houser was entitled to an extension of time in which to file his notice of appeal, and thus the court of appeals should not have dismissed the appeal. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Tex. R. App. P. 59.1.
Opinion delivered: January 11, 2008
To the unabated joy of pro se, IFP, and otherwise underprivileged customers of the state's courts, here is the first such plaintiff-friendly mercy ruling for the new year:
Houser v. McElveen, No. 06-0504 (Tex. Jan. 11, 2008)(per curiam)
BRUCE WAYNE HOUSER v. KENNETH W. MCELVEEN, ET AL.; from Jackson County; 13th district (13-05-00426-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 02/09/06)
Petitioner Bruce Wayne Houser, a pro se inmate, sued for mandamus compelling respondent Kenneth McElveen, the county clerk of Jackson County, to probate Houser’s father’s will. The trial court dismissed the petition, and Houser asserts, without challenge, that he deposited his notice of appeal in the prison mail 35 days later. The court of appeals received it on the 46th day after the judgment was signed and dismissed the appeal as not having been timely perfected. ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2006) (per curiam).
The notice of appeal was required to be filed within 30 days of the judgment, Tex. R. App. P. 26.1, but the court of appeals should have extended that time if, within the next 15 days, Houser filed his notice of appeal and a motion for extension with a reasonable explanation, Tex. R. App. P. 10.5(b), 25.1(a), 26.3. The notice of appeal was deemed filed on the day he mailed it, since it was received one day after the 15-day deadline, Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(b), Ramos v. Richardson, 228 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam), and a motion for extension was thereby implied, Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). The question, then, is whether there is “any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to file within the [specified] period was not deliberate or intentional, but was the result of inadvertence, mistake, or mischance.” Meshwert v. Meshwert, 549 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. 1977).
In his notice of appeal, and in his petition here without challenge, Houser states that he mailed a motion for new trial nine days after the judgment, and a copy of a transmittal letter bearing that date is attached. There is no motion for new trial in the trial court’s record, but Houser could reasonably have believed that the clerk would receive it within three weeks of when he says he mailed it.
An inmate who does everything in his power to satisfy timeliness requirements may not be penalized for the error or tardiness of prison officials. See Williams v. T.D.C.J.-I.D., 142 S.W.3d 308, 309-310 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam). If a motion for new trial had been received within 30 days of the judgment, Houser’s notice of appeal would have been timely filed. Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a)(1). This plausible statement of circumstances indicates that Houser’s failure to timely file his notice of appeal was not intentional but inadvertent. See Hone v. Hanafin, 104 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam).
Houser was entitled to an extension of time in which to file his notice of appeal, and thus the court of appeals should not have dismissed the appeal. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Tex. R. App. P. 59.1.
Opinion delivered: January 11, 2008
Saturday, June 30, 2007
Ramos v. Richardson (Tex. Jun. 29, 2007)(per curiam)
Texas Supreme Court Reverses Dismissal of Prisoner's Suit as Untimely
Construes Mailbox Rule In Context Where Appellant Does Not Have Access to U. S. Mailbox
Ramos v. Richardson, No. 06-0336 (Tex. Jun. 29, 2007)(per curiam)(prisoner suit, timeliness of notice of appeal)
Full style: Armando Ramos, Sr., et al. v. Dr. Ian Richardson & Valley Baptist Medical Center, et. al.; from Cameron County;
Appeals Court below: Corpus Christi Court of Appeals (13th appellate district)
No. 13 05 00204 CV-13-05-00205-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 02/09/2006)
Disposition: Without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and reinstates the appeal.
PER CURIAM OPINION
Petitioners Armando Ramos, an incarcerated pro se litigant, and members of his family originally brought medical malpractice actions against respondents Dr. Ian Richardson and Valley Baptist Medical Center. The trial court dismissed those suits on February 17, 2005, for noncompliance with the expert report requirements of section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The petitioners appealed. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure required the notices of appeal to be filed by March 21, 2005. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1, 4.1(a).[1] The petitioners claim Ramos delivered signed notices of appeal to the prison’s outgoing mailbox on March 9, 2005, for prison authorities to place in the United States mail. But the notices of appeal were not stamped “filed” by the clerk’s office of the court of appeals until March 22, 2005. The court of appeals dismissed the appeals, holding it was without jurisdiction because the petitioners’ notices of appeal were not timely filed within the plenary thirty-day period after entering judgment. ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. filed); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(d); Tex. R. App. P. 26.1. We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the appeals.
On March 4, 2005, the petitioners timely filed exceptions to the trial court’s order of dismissal. The petitioners argue such exceptions extended the timetable for their notices of appeal to ninety days under Rule 26.1(a)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. We need not address this argument because the petitioners waived it by failing to advance it in their petition for review. See Tex. R. App. P. 55.2 (stating that a petitioner’s brief on the merits must be confined to issues or points stated in the petition for review).
In the alternative, the petitioners argue their notices of appeal were timely filed under the “mailbox rule,” which states a document is deemed timely filed if it is sent to the proper clerk by first-class mail in a properly addressed, stamped envelope on or before the last day for filing and is received not more than ten days beyond the filing deadline. Tex. R. Civ. P. 5; Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(b)(1). Rule 9.2(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, entitled “Proof of Mailing,” adds the following:
Though it may consider other proof, the appellate court will accept the following as conclusive proof of the date of mailing:
(A) a legible postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service;
(B) a receipt for registered or certified mail if the receipt is endorsed by the United States Postal Service; or
(C) a certificate of mailing by the United States Postal Service.
Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(b)(2). Rule 9.2(b)(2) makes it clear that the petitioners have the burden of providing some measure of proof that their notices of appeal were placed in the United States mail on or before March 21, 2005. Such proof is present in the record in the form of the filing letter accompanying the petitioners’ notices of appeal and the certificate of service, which both state the notices of appeal were placed in the “outgoing prison mailbox” on March 9, 2005.
The respondents argue that, for purposes of the “mailbox rule,” placing the notices of appeal into the outgoing prison mailbox is not the equivalent of placing them into the United States mail. See Wembley Inv. Co. v. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d 924, 928 (Tex. 1999) (“[W]hen the sender of a document relies on office routine or custom to support an inference that the document was mailed, the sender must provide corroborating evidence that the practice was actually carried out.”).
But we have held on more than one occasion that an inmate who does everything necessary to satisfy timeliness requirements must not be penalized if the document is ultimately filed tardily because of an error on the part of officials over whom the inmate has no control. See, e.g., Williams v. T.D.C.J.-I.D., 142 S.W.3d 308, 309-10 (Tex. 2004); Warner v. Glass, 135 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. 2004).
In Williams, for example, an inmate’s docketing statement was not filed by the filing deadline solely because of an error by the clerk’s office of the court of appeals. 142 S.W.3d at 309. Because the inmate “did everything necessary to comply with the rules,” we held he could not be prejudiced. Id. at 310. And in Warner, we similarly declined to penalize an inmate who timely delivered a document to the prison mailbox. 135 S.W.3d at 684.
In this case, the record indicates Ramos did everything necessary to comply with the rules by placing the notices of appeal in the outgoing prison mailbox on March 9, 2005. It is not clear when prison officials placed the notices of appeal in the United States mail, but because they were received by the clerk on March 22, 2005, it is logical to assume they were placed in the mail, as was required under the rules, on or before March 21, 2005. Though the respondents contend Ramos could just as easily have given the notices of appeal to a family member who filed them in person after the March 21, 2005 deadline, there is nothing in the record to suggest that occurred.
Accordingly, we grant the petition for review and, without hearing oral argument, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the petitioners’ appeals. See Tex. R. App. P. 59.1.
OPINION DELIVERED: June 29, 2007
[1] The court of appeals acted under the impression that the trial court’s order became final on March 19, 2005. This is incorrect because March 19 fell on a Saturday. Rule 4.1(a) states:
The day of an act, event, or default after which a designated period begins to run is not included when computing a period prescribed or allowed by these rules, by court order, or by statute. The last day of the period is included, but if that day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period extends to the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
Tex. R. App. P. 4.1(a).
Construes Mailbox Rule In Context Where Appellant Does Not Have Access to U. S. Mailbox
Ramos v. Richardson, No. 06-0336 (Tex. Jun. 29, 2007)(per curiam)(prisoner suit, timeliness of notice of appeal)
Full style: Armando Ramos, Sr., et al. v. Dr. Ian Richardson & Valley Baptist Medical Center, et. al.; from Cameron County;
Appeals Court below: Corpus Christi Court of Appeals (13th appellate district)
No. 13 05 00204 CV-13-05-00205-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 02/09/2006)
Disposition: Without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and reinstates the appeal.
PER CURIAM OPINION
Petitioners Armando Ramos, an incarcerated pro se litigant, and members of his family originally brought medical malpractice actions against respondents Dr. Ian Richardson and Valley Baptist Medical Center. The trial court dismissed those suits on February 17, 2005, for noncompliance with the expert report requirements of section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The petitioners appealed. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure required the notices of appeal to be filed by March 21, 2005. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1, 4.1(a).[1] The petitioners claim Ramos delivered signed notices of appeal to the prison’s outgoing mailbox on March 9, 2005, for prison authorities to place in the United States mail. But the notices of appeal were not stamped “filed” by the clerk’s office of the court of appeals until March 22, 2005. The court of appeals dismissed the appeals, holding it was without jurisdiction because the petitioners’ notices of appeal were not timely filed within the plenary thirty-day period after entering judgment. ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. filed); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(d); Tex. R. App. P. 26.1. We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the appeals.
On March 4, 2005, the petitioners timely filed exceptions to the trial court’s order of dismissal. The petitioners argue such exceptions extended the timetable for their notices of appeal to ninety days under Rule 26.1(a)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. We need not address this argument because the petitioners waived it by failing to advance it in their petition for review. See Tex. R. App. P. 55.2 (stating that a petitioner’s brief on the merits must be confined to issues or points stated in the petition for review).
In the alternative, the petitioners argue their notices of appeal were timely filed under the “mailbox rule,” which states a document is deemed timely filed if it is sent to the proper clerk by first-class mail in a properly addressed, stamped envelope on or before the last day for filing and is received not more than ten days beyond the filing deadline. Tex. R. Civ. P. 5; Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(b)(1). Rule 9.2(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, entitled “Proof of Mailing,” adds the following:
Though it may consider other proof, the appellate court will accept the following as conclusive proof of the date of mailing:
(A) a legible postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service;
(B) a receipt for registered or certified mail if the receipt is endorsed by the United States Postal Service; or
(C) a certificate of mailing by the United States Postal Service.
Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(b)(2). Rule 9.2(b)(2) makes it clear that the petitioners have the burden of providing some measure of proof that their notices of appeal were placed in the United States mail on or before March 21, 2005. Such proof is present in the record in the form of the filing letter accompanying the petitioners’ notices of appeal and the certificate of service, which both state the notices of appeal were placed in the “outgoing prison mailbox” on March 9, 2005.
The respondents argue that, for purposes of the “mailbox rule,” placing the notices of appeal into the outgoing prison mailbox is not the equivalent of placing them into the United States mail. See Wembley Inv. Co. v. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d 924, 928 (Tex. 1999) (“[W]hen the sender of a document relies on office routine or custom to support an inference that the document was mailed, the sender must provide corroborating evidence that the practice was actually carried out.”).
But we have held on more than one occasion that an inmate who does everything necessary to satisfy timeliness requirements must not be penalized if the document is ultimately filed tardily because of an error on the part of officials over whom the inmate has no control. See, e.g., Williams v. T.D.C.J.-I.D., 142 S.W.3d 308, 309-10 (Tex. 2004); Warner v. Glass, 135 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. 2004).
In Williams, for example, an inmate’s docketing statement was not filed by the filing deadline solely because of an error by the clerk’s office of the court of appeals. 142 S.W.3d at 309. Because the inmate “did everything necessary to comply with the rules,” we held he could not be prejudiced. Id. at 310. And in Warner, we similarly declined to penalize an inmate who timely delivered a document to the prison mailbox. 135 S.W.3d at 684.
In this case, the record indicates Ramos did everything necessary to comply with the rules by placing the notices of appeal in the outgoing prison mailbox on March 9, 2005. It is not clear when prison officials placed the notices of appeal in the United States mail, but because they were received by the clerk on March 22, 2005, it is logical to assume they were placed in the mail, as was required under the rules, on or before March 21, 2005. Though the respondents contend Ramos could just as easily have given the notices of appeal to a family member who filed them in person after the March 21, 2005 deadline, there is nothing in the record to suggest that occurred.
Accordingly, we grant the petition for review and, without hearing oral argument, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the petitioners’ appeals. See Tex. R. App. P. 59.1.
OPINION DELIVERED: June 29, 2007
[1] The court of appeals acted under the impression that the trial court’s order became final on March 19, 2005. This is incorrect because March 19 fell on a Saturday. Rule 4.1(a) states:
The day of an act, event, or default after which a designated period begins to run is not included when computing a period prescribed or allowed by these rules, by court order, or by statute. The last day of the period is included, but if that day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period extends to the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
Tex. R. App. P. 4.1(a).
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